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Ethnicity is increasingly central to analysis of war.1 Whether conceived in es-
sentialist or constructivist terms, ethnicity is often accorded explanatory pri-
macy in accounting for the organization and use of violence in wartime settings,
in part due to the utility of processes of othering for group mobilization. Both
the political and ideological context of hostilities as well as the motivations of
combatants in the actual making of wartime violence are frequently conceptu-
alized in ethnic and racialized terms.2 In a word, wartime violence is domesti-
cated; it is seen as arising from the identities of, and commitments to, home-
lands.
This domestication of wartime violence involves two distinct and interrelat-
ed moves which together form an ‘ethnic war complex.’3 The first is that eth-
nic identities provide the basis for the group formation necessary to large-scale,
militarized violence. The second is that the willingness of such groups to kill
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and sacrifice, as well as commit atrocity against racialized others, largely fol-
lows from their ethnic identity. Together the two moves are mutually reinforc-
ing, and analyses indebted to this complex take similar form whether the group
identity in question is attributed to ethnicity, modern nationalism, or even a
‘civilization.’4 However, if military group formation cannot be reduced to eth-
nic or national identity, then it is considerably more difficult to account for
wartime violence and atrocity by reference to such identities. If ethnic hatred
does not supply the meaningful basis for violence, how do we account for the
particularly savage nature of certain battlefields, such as those of the Eastern
Front or the Pacific War?
Through study of the place of ethnicity in the organization and use of force
in the multi-ethnic army Britain assembled to fight the Japanese in Burma in
the Second World War, this essay develops an alternative understanding of the
cultural constitution of military force and the making of wartime violence. One
of the consequences of the pervasiveness of an ethnic imaginary in accounts of
war is the systematic neglect of the transnational dimensions of military pow-
er. In the Second World War, the British Indian Army reached a strength of two
million men.5 Together, Indians and Africans made up over two-thirds of the
‘British’ forces deployed in Burma, the largest land campaign fought by Japan
outside of China in the Pacific War.
Imperial and other ‘non-national’or foreign troops can serve as a critical van-
tage point on the ethnic war complex. In Burma, British Indian and African
forces were to earn fighting reputations on the kind of savage battlefields that,
elsewhere, have led scholars to invoke nationalism and racial ideologies. For
troops in imperial service, nationalism could not define the warring sides nor
can it provide the basis for social solidarity. What, then, were the relations be-
tween ethnicity and processes of group formation in imperial militaries? What
light might that throw on military group formation more generally? Far from
being the stable basis of group identity, ethnicity was reworked within process-
es of imperial military organization.
For the ethnic war complex, ethnic antagonism is assumed to be the basis of
wartime violence, the willingness to kill and die. In Burma, however, where
both sides generally refused to take prisoners and battlefield atrocities were
common, the fighting generated more race hate than it initially required. Indi-
an, African, and even British soldiers were largely ignorant of the Japanese un-
til they met them in battle. This relation between war and ethnic antagonism is
a reversal of the usual construction in which the latter is a cause of the former.
How, then, are we to account for the intense and savage fighting that charac-
terized the Burma campaign? Part of the answer is in fact to be found in process-
es of othering. But such processes were largely generic to wartime, military set-
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tings and did not generally require the kind of deep-seated racism in civilian so-
ciety that Omer Bartov and John Dower have recourse to in accounting for the
barbarities of the Eastern Front and the Pacific War respectively. Due to a va-
riety of circumstances in Burma, an intensifying feedback loop of ever more
savage fighting developed, generating an extreme antagonism often narrated by
participants in racialized terms.
The first section below critically reviews the contrasting emphases placed on
military and society in accounting for ‘combat motivation’ and outlines the ar-
guments to follow. The second section deals with group formation, and pro-
vides an analysis of the organization of ethnicity in the British Indian Army.
The third addresses the dynamics of battle in Burma and soldiers’ representa-
tions of their experience. The conclusion returns to the theme of this introduc-
tion, that ready reference to an image of the world as composed of distinct and
potentially antagonistic ethnic groups obscures the transnational dimensions of
military organization and wartime violence. Arjun Appadurai notes that the
“trope of the tribe” dominates our accounts “largely because forceful alterna-
tives to it have yet to be articulated.”6 This essay seeks to contribute the basis
of such an alternative for our understanding of wartime violence.
society, military and battle
The essential proposition of the ethnic war complex is that group identities em-
anate from beyond military and wartime experience, yet enter into and funda-
mentally shape that experience. ‘Pre-existing’ ethnic or national identities, and
their attendant constructions of friends and enemies, provide both the basis of
group solidarity and the motivation to kill and sacrifice. The counter-proposi-
tion argued here is that the military, as well as campaigning and battle, com-
prise sets of historically variable structural relations which in large measure
constitute the individuals and groups involved. The military and war are in part
generative of the very identities which, in retrospect, appear to have motivated
the combatants in the first place. The basis of this argument is that regular mil-
itary service and the experience of combat are transformative. However, the
cultural resources militaries draw on to make soldiers, as well as those soldiers
fall back on to narrate their experiences, are derived from wider social context.
Analysis must be sensitive to the nexus between society and military but not in
the ‘either/or’ fashion that has characterized much of the debate over these is-
sues.
War, and especially fighting, raise questions regarding the nature and sources
of social solidarity. Fighting involves an armed clash between bodies of troops
in which casualties are both suffered and inflicted. Vigorous and effective mil-
itary service requires personal sacrifice, potentially of life, for group success
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and survival. The questions become what are the relevant groups and what are
their social bases? Extant analysis in military history and sociology moves be-
tween two ideal typical answers to these questions. The first concerns the de-
sign and quality of military organizations and, in particular, their capacity for
producing and sustaining closely-knit ‘primary groups’ of soldiers who fight
for group survival in battlefield conditions.7 The relevant groups are soldiers’
immediate comrades and the fighting formations of which they are a part. The
second ideal type concerns the ‘civilian’ social and political context in which
military organizations and their personnel are embedded.8 The relevant groups
are a product of national, often racialized, constructions of friends and enemies.
This debate is profoundly shaped by its encounter with German armed forces
in the Second World War and is in many ways unsatisfactory. While fighting
for group survival is a central insight into the dynamics of battle, the idea of the
‘primary group’risks overly psychologizing military organization. In their sem-
inal article, Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz derived the ‘primary group’from
a particular Freudian conception of basic personality needs. As long as soldiers’
immediate comrades and the unit of which they were a part continued to meet
these needs, they would continue to fight. This approach can obscure the more
general disciplinary and transformative capacities of military organizations.
These capacities involve a wide range of social processes, including ritual re-
lations as in drill; the dynamics of sacrifice and its representation as in the in-
culcation of regimental myth; and gender relations as in constructions of war-
rior masculinity.
The opposing emphasis on the social and political context of armed forces is
also problematic. Reference to social context is often made to account for cases
of savage and intense fighting and the widespread commission of atrocities, as
in Bartov’s Hitler’s Army. One difficulty is that Bartov’s polemic against ‘pri-
mary group theory’ and claim that German soldiers became “devoted believers
in a murderous ideology” understate the role military organization and specif-
ic campaign experiences play in his own account.9 For example, the nature of
the Russian Front, including the relatively primitive built environment, the
harsh weather, and the Red Army’s brutal use of its lavish manpower, worked
to make Nazi racial categories particularly salient for German soldiers fighting
in the East. Organizational factors such as increasingly uncompromising com-
bat discipline, the failure to effectively prosecute war crimes, and the frequent
severe lack of adequate clothing, shelter and food contributed significantly to
soldiers’ commission of atrocities and their depredations on the civilian popu-
lation. As Bartov suggests, atrocities served in part as an outlet for the pressures
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confronting German soldiers, while Nazi ideology provided a convenient ratio-
nale for their behavior. The experiences of the German army in the East trans-
formed it into ‘Hitler’s Army.’
There are further and more significant difficulties with Bartov’s approach.
For Bartov, the savagery and intensity of the fighting on the Eastern Front as
well as the involvement of the army in atrocities and war crimes are indicative
of the specifically Nazi social and political character of the army. This argu-
ment leaves analysts struggling to find functional equivalents of Nazi ideology
to account for battlefield savagery elsewhere, such as the Yellow Peril for
Americans in the Pacific War. Like Daniel Goldhagen’s approach to the work
of mass murder, Bartov requires the careful pairing of soldiers’ racial and ide-
ological commitments with their wartime objects of violence.10 Sadly, the his-
tory of warfare contains a surfeit of barbarity, transnational in scope, which de-
feats such an exercise. For example, a significant proportion of the mass killings
in the occupied portions of the Soviet Union were carried out by foreign para-
militaries in German service.11 Such phenomena expose an important assump-
tion in Bartov’s work: that killing and violence are difficult for humans, who
are not ‘naturally dangerous’ but must be transformed into killers through ide-
ological indoctrination. This assumption easily leads to essentializing the iden-
tity of combatants as Nazis, racists, Serbs, Hutus, or whatnot, while corre-
spondingly comforting the rest of us that absent such motivations, we would
not participate in the extremes of wartime savagery.
Significantly, some analysts of violence and war have begun from the oppo-
site assumption, that the military and wartime conditions bring out and en-
courage the ‘killer in all men.’12 This insight helps shift analysis away from the
question of how the extraordinary motivations of particular individuals and
groups overcome human pacificity. Instead, attention is redirected to the wider
conditions which either encourage violence and allow it to run amok or prevent
it from doing so. Rather than reducing battle and other wartime violence and
barbarity to a question of participants’motivation, analysis focuses on the struc-
tural relations at work. In making this turn, it is not necessary to essentialize
humans as either pacific or violent. Particular attributes and actions of partici-
pants in a battle emerge in the conflict situation itself, shaped but not deter-
mined by social background. Additionally, a structural approach enables the
crucial distinction between the determinants of combatants’ conduct or behav-
ior, on the one hand, and how they might represent that behavior on the other.13
The Burma campaign was by no means the Eastern Front in terms of either
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the scale of the fighting or the casualties incurred, but it was, in the words of a
historian who served there, “a very cruel war.”14 The fighting exhibited many
of the same features that characterized the island battlefields of the Pacific,
where the fanaticism of the Japanese or the racism of the Americans, or both,
are invoked in explanation. Yet, rather than a “spiritual clash between warrior
representatives of two cultures,” as Craig Cameron has characterized the fight-
ing on Guadalcanal, the Allies were represented in Burma by an imperial army
cobbled together from a variety of populations.15 The group identities of the In-
dian Army, which supplied the bulk of the troops, were neither simply reflective
of indigenous ethnic relations nor based on Indian political entities or purposes.
Nonetheless, Indian and African soldiers proved capable of holding their
ground against and eventually defeating the determined infantry of the Imper-
ial Japanese Army (IJA).
The next section focuses on the contingent and variable relations between eth-
nicity and group formation in the Indian Army. The following section takes up
the question of battle. In the absence of established racialized constructions of
friends and enemies among the imperial soldiery, why did battle in Burma take
on such an intense and savage character? The analysis below is neither intend-
ed to establish that nationalism and societal racism play no role in savage battle
nor could it. However, what follows outlines an alternative account of military
group formation and the origins and character of savage battle, one which does
not find in the ‘trope of the tribe’ a self-evident explanation, but rather refigures
it as a technique employed by practitioners, and not always effectively.
the organization of ethnicity in the british indian army
Ethnicity is an apparently natural basis for group solidarity, both for scholars
seeking to explain it and for professional officers seeking to create it. Many
metropolitan and colonial armies utilized regional, ‘tribal,’ religious and local
identities in fostering esprit de corps. The Indian Army was no exception. But
just what role did ethnicity play in processes of group formation?
In reference to a much earlier period of British involvement in India, John
Lynn argues that South Asian culture and religious norms underpinned the loy-
alty and morale of British Indian troops: “be not misled by the British red coat
of the sepoy; beneath it beat the heart of India.”16 But for Stephen Rosen,
British Indian armies were effective “due to a form of military organization that
increased the cohesion of the army by divorcing it from society,” which he con-
ceives as riven by caste divisions.17 These two perspectives conceive ethnicity
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as fixed and given by civilian society. In the first, civilian identities underwrite
military service; in the second, the military is cordoned off from the ethnic dif-
ferences of civilian society. But as British rule continued and deepened, it
played an increasing role in constructing Indian communal identities, a process
in which the Indian Army and its ‘martial races’ came to be closely bound up.18
As such, analysis must address the ways in which ethnicity was both incor-
porated into, and transformed by, the Indian Army.19 Through ‘martial races’
discourse, military officials sought administratively to order India’s diverse
populations into clearly differentiated categories of caste, religion, and region.
Only on this ‘official’ basis were communal identities incorporated into mili-
tary organization. Ethnicity, however, proved far more flexible in processes of
group formation than either the ethnic war complex or ‘martial races’discourse
allows. Rather than being the basis for group formation, ethnicity provided mu-
table resources for organizing difference.
By the time of the World Wars, the Indian Army was composed of a variety
of ethnic ‘classes,’ or ‘martial races.’ British officials believed that each ‘class’
of troops reflected a distinct ethnic group in Indian society.20 They sought to
oppose one to the other in the army. The idea was to foster group spirit through
friendly rivalry and competition among units and to avoid the kind of cultural
homogeneity that was seen as in part responsible for the mutiny and rebellion
of 1857.21 However, in practice it was necessary to use the disciplinary capac-
ities of military organization to ensure the men lived up to the official image of
their religions and cultures. Before divide et imperia could be applied to the In-
dian Army, distinct ethnic groups had first to be invented and constituted
through a variety of boundary drawing practices.
The discussion below outlines how ethnicity was incorporated into the Indi-
an Army, its role in patterns of resistance and discipline, and the ways in which,
despite deliberate reinforcement, ethnic difference was often overcome in con-
ditions of wartime military service. As will be seen, ethnicity could be empha-
sized in group formation or played down; it provided symbolic resources for
resistance as well as obedience; and ethnic difference proved no obstacle to
group formation when soldiers were placed in common conditions and shared
experiences.
The ‘Class’ Organization of the Indian Army
‘Class’ organization was derived from ‘martial races’ discourse, which was
based on a distinction between those populations considered to possess martial
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qualities and those which were not.22 While the notion that certain populations
were suited for military service had a basis in the caste system, the distinctions
involved reflected British constructions of Indian society. In classifying popu-
lations through shifting combinations of physique, place, and culture, ‘martial
races’ discourse participated in constructing boundaries between groups.23 It
did so in part simply through restricting recruitment to the favored minority
populations, while also ensuring that once in service recruits conformed to the
British image of their indigenous culture.
Regardless of their artificiality, martial categories had real consequences in
terms of access to employment in the army. By the Second World War, the In-
dian Army had been recruiting many of its favored classes for almost a centu-
ry. The communities from which the soldiers were recruited were shaped by the
cultural experience as well as the financial benefits and political access of mil-
itary service. The Sikhs, for example, were defined as a recruitable group by
religion and caste, the warrior dimensions of which were then emphasized over
others. The scale of Sikh employment in the army during the Raj further influ-
enced the development of Sikhism in martial directions.24 Regimental tradi-
tions, rituals, and uniform played a role in this along with the circulation of Sikh
men between barracks and village. Officers put considerable effort into ensur-
ing that Sikhs in service conformed to a British image of what the ‘pure’ Sikh
was like. As one British commander of a Sikh company wrote home, “The Sikhs
have many religious customs; we see that they keep them whether they like it
or not.”25
Most Indian Army infantry battalions were organized on a “class-company”
basis. Each company was generally of a different ethnicity, such that a battal-
ion might have a company of Sikhs, one of Dogras, one of Pathans, and one of
Punjabi Muslims. A company would be headed by a commissioned officer, al-
ways British until the interwar period, assisted by Viceroy Commissioned Of-
ficers (VCOs). VCOs were an intermediate class of officer promoted from the
ranks who mediated between the commissioned officers and the men. The
VCOs in each company were usually of the same class as the men, and British
officers were expected to know the native language of the class they com-
manded as well as the army lingua franca, Urdu. At the battalion level, senior
VCOs, who ideally had the respect and confidence of all the classes in the unit,
would aid the battalion commander in maintaining good relations among the
various classes. It was important for morale that promotions and other goods
were equally shared. The long-service nature of the Indian Army meant that bat-
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talions often had great stability of personnel, and in a good battalion experi-
enced officers and VCOs would know and trust one another, having served
many years together in various capacities.
A basic feature of the class organization of the army was the reinforcement
of ethnic difference. Peter Gadsdon, a wartime officer in 4/14th Punjab, new to
the Indian Army, learned about the “foibles” of each class while his battalion
trained for service in Burma: “A Company, the Sikhs, grew their hair long and
never cut it during their lifetime . . . [They] also do not smoke, and to offer them
a cigarette is an insult. B Company were Dogras, many of them Hindus of the
high Brahmin caste. The Cow is a sacred animal to all Hindus, and they were
very careful in their eating and drinking habits . . . My Punjabi Mussulmans in
C Company held that all pork was defiled and the more strait-laced of them
would not touch alcohol. D Company Pathans were also Muslims and held the
same views, but, in their case, it was easy to upset them over their honour, about
which they could sometimes be touchy.”26
Cultural differences among the classes were reinforced in numerous ways in-
cluding uniform, religion and diet. Battalions in garrison maintained holy men
for each religion represented in its ranks, who would hold separate services for
the Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim companies. Religion was woven into the fabric of
discipline, making any deviation from religious precepts difficult for individu-
als, while violations of military discipline became a religious matter.
The Indian Army used diet and mealtime rituals to maintain difference as
well as to integrate formations. In an infantry battalion, each class would pre-
pare its own particular cuisine in ways which respected religious and caste dic-
tates, eating in separate messes. As Bruce Lincoln notes, there is nothing “more
conducive to the integration of society than the ritual of sharing food.”27 Not
only are bonds of sentiment and obligation established among those who share
the meal, but a rigid boundary is drawn between them and those who do not.
In accounts of relations between military and society, analysts construct the
significance of civilian ethnic difference for military service differently. Some
argue that if militaries reflect the ethnic divisions of civilian society, they will
lack the cohesion needed for combat.28 Others see the military, due to its rigid
disciplinary structure and capacity to transform individuals, as a potential agent
of social change, capable of overcoming ethnic prejudice in the ranks through
leadership, incentives, and punishments.29 Both these arguments reflect the his-
torical experience of different military institutions. What is crucial is the par-
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ticular way in which a military organizes ethnic difference and how it structures
the salience that difference has for soldiers. In explicitly seeking to foster eth-
nic distinctiveness in its infantry battalions, the Indian Army ensured that eth-
nicity was a basis for group formation in military life, in ways both productive
and corrosive of discipline and fighting spirit.
Ethnicity, Resistance, and Discipline in the Indian Army
In creating ethnically distinct units, the British made space for each class to or-
ganize resistance on the basis of caste and religion and for the men to draw on
their communal ties in doing so. Caste could be invoked to avoid distasteful
jobs, whether through conviction or calculation. After the 1935 earthquake in
Quetta, the 4/19th Hyderabad was sent to bury corpses and its high caste com-
pany of Kumaonis refused to touch the dead on grounds that it would break their
caste, relenting only when British and Indian officers, among them a Brahmin,
set to work first as an example.30 While this affair was localized, the commu-
nal organization of the army made it easy for trouble to spread.
In the early period of the war, there were a number of instances of unrest in
Sikh units.31 The Sikhs made use of the potent symbol of the Sikh turban as a
mechanism for organizing resistance. Any Sikh who wore his steel helmet could
be seen to have violated his religion. Grievances that might be local in nature
could easily involve other troops of that class through use of religious and com-
munal symbols. An important factor underlying unrest in Sikh units, especial-
ly those about to embark for overseas service, was tension in the Punjab aris-
ing from the Muslim League’s goal of an independent Pakistan. Worried that
the situation would turn violent, as it eventually did, the Sikhs were concerned
they would be unable to protect their families. The communal organization of
the army created space for communal politics to disturb discipline.
However, the manner in which the army was organized shaped the way com-
munalism asserted itself. Most men in the infantry battalions served alongside
others of their caste, religion, and region, sharing common conditions and mak-
ing such identities an obvious basis for organizing resistance. Each regiment
recruited from particular regions, and recruits often had a variety of local ties
with one another and other serving soldiers. Informal groups in the ranks were
often based on these ‘sub-class’ local relations.32 Even so, once organized in
classes, class took on great salience for the troops concerned, as each class
sought to protect its position with respect to promotions and other perks and
benefits. Class had a significance for the everyday life of soldiers over and
above the communal differences of Indian society due to the fact that the army
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was organized in class terms. It was thus a primary basis for group formation
and competition in units, but not one which simply reflected distinct ethnic
groups in civil society.
For example, there was an important difference between the role caste played
in the army as opposed to Indian society. In civil society, despite the local va-
riety and fluidity in caste relations, castes were generally hierarchically or-
dered. However, in the army, it was vital for discipline and morale that even
though caste differences were respected, all castes had to be treated equally.
Each class in a battalion, regardless of its relative position in the hierarchies of
colonial Indian society, had to be handled on an equivalent basis.
Classes in a battalion were acutely sensitive to issues of fairness in terms of
promotions, perks, and the assignment of difficult duties. The NCOs and VCOs
of each class or sub-group would protect the interests of their troops. New of-
ficers in the Indian Army were warned about “bhai bundi,” or ‘brotherhoodli-
ness,’ the idea that men with village or kinship ties will watch out for one an-
other.33 There were frequent charges of nepotism, favoritism as well as graft
organized on a class or sub-class basis.34 VCOs would seek to ensure that men
from their family, village, or community were promoted.35 In peacetime, the
presence of experienced officers who spoke their men’s language and long ser-
vice VCOs ensured that such troubles were kept to a minimum. The stability of
class composition in the peacetime army also meant that it was relatively easy
to treat each class fairly, as the proportion of classes in a unit rarely changed,
ensuring an equivalent number of NCO and VCO positions for each class.
During the Second World War, the manpower pressures of expansion led to
the recruitment of new classes and their insertion into formations composed
mainly of pre-war classes, producing numerous problems centered around ten-
sions and rivalries between classes. Classes sometimes had to be mixed together
in the same companies. There was an overall decline in the quality and experi-
ence of battalions’ personnel as the proportion of regular pre-war officers and
VCOs dropped. The problems that resulted in these cases had less to do with
the communal tensions of Indian civil society, although these played a role, than
with the ways in which the fixed ethnic categories of the Indian Army were dis-
rupted by upheaval in wartime personnel policy.
In the 10/16th Punjab, the proportions of Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus had to
be altered due to difficulty recruiting Dogras and Sikhs, increasing the per-
centage of Muslim troops. As a consequence, Sikh/Muslim tensions ran high
in the unit and involved theft of arms. The number of Sikh NCOs and VCOs
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dropped with the proportion of Sikh troops, and the chances of the remaining
Sikhs for promotion declined, further contributing to Sikh grievances.36 Simi-
lar problems arose in the 4/14th Punjab. Prior to going to Burma, they were un-
able to find enough recruits of the right class to fill out their Sikh and Dogra
companies. They made up numbers with Jats in the Sikh company and Gujars
and Ahirs in the Dogra company. It had been intended to put these new classes
in their own platoons under their own VCOs, but because these classes had not
previously been recruited in the army, “the men were far too junior to hold any
thing but lower rank appointments.” They were spread out among the Sikhs and
Dogras: “[i]t was almost inevitable this ended in the greatest dissatisfaction.”37
The new classes were shunned, particularly in the Sikh company, having no
VCOs to look out for their interests, and eventually became “surly and unwill-
ing to fight.”38 In other battalions, too, minor trouble arose in companies com-
posed predominantly of one class ‘victimizing’ other classes who were tem-
porarily making up numbers.39
In a closed social space such as a battalion, individuals affiliate with groups
capable of seeing to their interests and needs. Such informal groups have dif-
ferential capacities to protect their members and victimize others in part deter-
mined by the authority structure of the unit. While in the Indian Army group
formation was facilitated by communal identities, informal groups of this kind
are found in all militaries and similar institutions, such as prison camps.40 Pat-
terns of group formation can be altered by commanders who restructure the ca-
pacities of such groups to protect their members or victimize others.
For example, the kind of minor trouble described above could be averted by
different handling of relations between class groups. The 2/13th Frontier Force
Rifles faced the problem of promotions among newly recruited classes but
avoided any trouble through promoting men of the new classes despite their
short service. “The old classes did not approve originally, but, when told that
the promotions would go on no matter how much they moaned about numbers
being cut, soon shut up.”41 In this unit, command ensured that ethnic organi-
zation did not have a negative bearing on the everyday life of the new soldiers
and so it did not become a disciplinary problem.
Even though class organization was a cause of trouble, it was simultaneous-
ly a source of discipline, especially in the hands of officers who knew how to
manipulate it. Many Sikhs, for example, realized that the spate of desertions
and minor mutinies in the early years of the war might give their class a bad
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name and lead to a reduction of their presence in the army, on which Sikh com-
munities depended for their livelihood. One Sikh soldier in the 10/12th Fron-
tier Force Rifles entraining for service in the Middle East told a British officer,
“[w]e are thoroughly ashamed of desertions that have taken place amongst
Sikhs, and it is our intention to wipe out the disgrace.”42
Class disaffection could be turned into fighting spirit. In the demoralized Jat
company of the 8/19th Hyderabad, there were tensions between two sub-class-
es of Jat, those from East Punjab and those from Uttar Pradesh, aggravated by
VCOs who sought to assert the interests of their respective sub-classes. The bat-
talion commander, Lt. Col. Thimayya, played upon the Jats’ sense—as a com-
pany—of their warrior prowess vis-à-vis the other companies. Soon the Jats
“wanted to be used in an important action so that their bravery would be
proved.” When the opportunity came, Thimayya told them they now had a
chance to vindicate themselves: “I ordered a bayonet charge. That morning the
Jats went wild.” Afterwards, they were “exuberant.”43 The articulation of class
honor with warrior masculinity trumped, as it were, communal tensions among
the Jats, subsuming two group identities with a third. From Thimayya’s point
of view, he had created a virtuous cycle in which each company would seek to
outdo the others on the battlefield. Here, rather than being a source of trouble,
class became a source of élan.
As can be seen, it was neither military organization nor the communal divi-
sions of civilian society which alone was responsible for the disciplinary prob-
lems and benefits arising from class organization. What was important was the
particular, often local manner in which the Indian Army incorporated, shaped,
and conditioned ethnic difference.
Overcoming Ethnic Difference
The term ‘ethnicity’ denotes the nearly infinite elasticity of religion, culture,
language, place, and bodily characteristics in the making and unmaking of so-
cial groupings. As Lincoln comments, such groups are composed “of people
who feel bound together as a collectivity and, in corollary fashion, feel them-
selves separate from others who fall outside their group.”44 Not only are such
groups continually in the process of being remade through the evocation of re-
lations of affinity and estrangement, but new groups can be constructed which
may encompass previous groups or split them apart. The flexibility of ethnici-
ty is apparent in the ways in which the British created fixed ethnic categories
for their troops, who were then required to alter their practices to fit categories
ostensibly based on their own civilian identities. But as easily as military ser-
vice could inscribe ethnic difference, it could also unmake it. In the 2/13th Fron-
tier Force Rifles, Jats who had temporarily made up numbers in the Sikh com-
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pany offered to convert to Sikhism in order to remain with the battalion.45 Eth-
nicity was indeterminate in defining social groupings. Common conditions and
shared experience were more significant.
In the support branches of the Indian Army, as well as in many African for-
mations, ethnicity was organized in ways which successfully broke down dif-
ference. Even in the class-company infantry battalions of the Indian Army, the
nature of everyday life in the military, especially in wartime, often served to
overcome difference. Additionally, ethnic difference in sub-units could be used
to create cohesiveness and excellence in higher formations through competi-
tion, as in the example from Colonel Thimayya’s battalion. Ethnicity was not
the only basis for identity in the Indian Army. Military unit identities offered
other, overlapping bases.
In the Indian Army, it was official policy to maintain ethnic difference, even
when soldiers were desirous of overcoming difference. While British officers of-
ten thought that Indians would serve in the army only if their religion and caste
were respected, there is much evidence to the contrary. During the Second World
War some British officers became aware that they were more insistent on the
maintenance of caste and religion than their troops. The commander of an engi-
neer company in the 10th Indian Division noted with surprise that many of his
men were in favor of breaking down caste restrictions, citing instances in which
food which violated caste was eaten voluntarily: “Prewar NCOs and VCOs are
apt to be still a little strict not I think alive to genuine religious feeling but to a
‘diehard’ sense that the Corps always has been run that way and any change is
contrary to ‘standing orders.’” He concluded that “established Corps customs
are in retard of contemporary feeling and are restricting any progress.”46
Many subsidiary branches of the army ‘mixed’ rather than separated classes
of troops, as did the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force. The In-
dian Observer Corps, for example, mixed all classes of Hindus together with-
out trouble and used Punjabi and other Muslim troops as cadre for units re-
cruited in Assam and South India with no difficulties arising from religion or
caste.47 The assumption had been that classes would not mix due to their own
prejudices, but experience proved otherwise: “The Recruiting Directorate
points out that that the pre-war idea that classes would not mix in the Army was
erroneous. Vested class interests, bogus caste prejudices, and parochial mind-
ed [British Officers] and V.C.O.’s [sic] have endeavored unsuccessfully to
maintain the narrow class composition on which most of the pre-war Army was
based.”48 One engineering unit purposely made its soldiers do something to de-
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file their caste and religion, such as work with leather or eat prohibited foods.
The men messed together and there were no reported communal tensions.49
This unit created cohesion by breaking down rather than maintaining differ-
ence, placing everyone in common conditions.
Dietary restrictions were frequently violated in practice. Especially on active
service, it sometimes became necessary for Hindus to eat beef or for vegetari-
ans to eat meat simply because other rations were unavailable. Generally in
such cases, it was possible to violate dietary restrictions without resistance from
the men, although sometimes officers deceived troops as to what they were in
fact eating out of their own fears that the men would reject the food.50
While mealtime rituals generally replicate social divisions and hierarchies,
there are possibilities for meals to “serve as the instruments with which alterna-
tives are posed to the established order.”51 In the branches of the Indian Army
which mixed classes together, the common mess was an important site for over-
coming ethnic difference. There are also examples from infantry units. Captain
Sahgal recounts instances in which he arranged for the Hindu and Muslim VCOs
of his battalion to dine together. For Sahgal, separate messes illustrated the “un-
natural barriers which had been built up in the Indian Army to keep Hindus and
Muslims apart.”52 The various violations of dietary rituals reveal the flexibility
of caste and religious practices with respect to military organization. The army
created the sense that meals had to be taken separately by rigidly maintaining
difference. However, through leadership, as in Sahgal’s case, or necessity, as on
active operations, apparently fixed barriers crumbled relatively easily.
The mutability of ethnicity with respect to military service is apparent also
in the East and West African forces. Although recruitment was largely deter-
mined by which ‘tribes’ were considered martial, distinct ethnic identities were
not officially maintained and reinforced in service. Rather than separating men
into ethnically differentiated platoons or companies, they were generally mixed
together. Civilian ethnicity simply did not have the same salience in the bulk of
the East or West African forces because they were organized differently.53
Higher formations offered another level at which soldiers could identify ir-
respective of ethnicity. A regimental or other unit identity could be interposed
between soldiers and the differences of civil society.54 While the companies of
a battalion in the Indian Army might be divided by ethnicity, they would all
share the same regimental identity.
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This section has dealt with the first half of the ethnic war complex, the role
of ethnicity in processes of military group formation. Despite the essentialist
ethnic principles that governed Indian Army organization, ethnic relations were
constructed in the course of organizational processes and their interaction with
social context. Rather than being the basis for group formation, ethnicity pro-
vided mutable resources for the military organization of difference. How a mil-
itary structures the salience that ethnic difference has for soldiers is a crucial
component in group formation and the production of identity.
The next section deals with the second half of the ethnic war complex, the
question of the meaningful basis for wartime violence and the putative role of
racialized constructions of self and other. In common with the arguments made
above, it will argue that for combat troops the relevant identity constructions
are largely generated within the military and campaign context, rather than be-
ing pre-given by civilian society.
battle and representation in burma
It is commonly observed in military sociology that ‘multi-ethnic’armies are not
as effective in combat as ‘national’ ones.55 Certainly the class organization of
the Indian Army created tremendous administrative difficulties in replacing
heavy losses in the correct class proportions. Nonetheless, the Indian Army
proved itself in battle, with many of its formations—such as the 4th Indian Di-
vision—earning very tough reputations against first-class opponents. In the Far
East, the Indian Army initially suffered severe defeats in Malaya, Singapore,
and Burma where its battalions were composed in large measure of new re-
cruits, the pre-war regulars having already been sent to North Africa and the
Middle East. However, from 1943, Indian, African, and British forces in Bur-
ma and Northeast India, under the command of Sir William Slim’s 14th Army,
began to stiffen. In 1944, they repulsed a major Japanese offensive at the deci-
sive battles of Imphal and Kohima and shortly thereafter they began their suc-
cessful reconquest of Burma.
The fighting in Burma was brutal by the standards of the Second World War.
Refusal to accept surrender was the norm for both sides. Enemy wounded were
generally killed out of hand. Atrocities were common and included the abuse,
torture, and killing of those who did manage to surrender. Japanese mistreat-
ment of Allied POWs is well-known but Japanese soldiers who surrendered, or
tried to, faced widespread mistreatment.56 What the fighting lacked in scale (as
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compared to that in Europe), it made up for in intensity and savagery.57 The
commander of an Indian division reported of his first experiences with the Jap-
anese that “The Jap is a ‘killer’ and he does not mind being killed . . . The fight-
ing therefore is always at a remarkably ‘intense’tempo.”58 ABritish officer who
fought in Europe and Burma commented of one engagement, “I would go
through the whole campaign in Europe again rather than that 7 days in Sang-
shak. The tempo and fierceness of the fighting did not compare.”59
It is in conditions of savage fighting and barbarity that scholars have ex-
planatory recourse to national identities and racial ideologies. For the ethnic
war complex, ethnic identities, and the constructions of self and other they en-
tail, account for wartime violence. The racial prejudices of national societies
are manifest on the battlefield. Battlefield conduct is evidence of an identifica-
tion of the common soldier with the nation, racial ideology, and the legitima-
tion of political authority more generally.
Students of the Pacific War have had little difficulty in finding the most ex-
treme racism among the personal and official accounts of Allied soldiers, and
the Burma campaign is no exception.60 A British general noted of the Japanese
that they “are in fact highly efficient and completely ruthless barbarians and, as
the Chinese have long ago discovered a policy of complete extermination is the
only one possible.”61 But the fact that the fighting is represented by participants
in racist, and here even exterminationist terms is not the last word in the mat-
ter. Certainly racist constructions provided a language through which combat-
ants could make meaningful their experience of war, whether during or after
the fact. However, that for many soldiers such constructions were developed in
the course of the fighting should inspire caution in assessing the role of ethnic
antagonism in the making of wartime violence.62 Battle, like military organi-
zation, sets in train its own cultural processes. Soldiers’ representations should
be interpreted less as reports of their inner motivation than as partial descrip-
tions and efforts to make meaningful sense of a structural context common to
both sides.
The discussion below begins by using the problem of surrender in Burma to
illustrate both how the structure of battle shaped and conditioned the behavior
of participants, and how it generated feedback loops that intensified the fight-
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ing. At the same time, as Allied soldiers cited Japanese refusal to surrender or
accept surrender as evidence of irredeemable otherness, they began to behave
in very similar ways. There was a convergence of patterns of battlefield con-
duct among the antagonists regardless of their origins or on which side they
fought. The discussion then turns to participants’ narrations of battlefield ex-
periences, showing how the battlefield context in combination with official pro-
paganda generated racialized representations of self and other.
The Problem of Surrender
Wherever the Japanese were encountered in battle, what most astonished Al-
lied soldiers was their determination to die rather than surrender. As Charles
Carfrae wrote of his experience on Chindit operations: “The Japanese—those
hobgoblins of the forest, the enemy—were beyond easy reach of our imagina-
tion. They were men, of a sort, of course, but men totally alien . . . giving no
quarter and expecting none . . . However hopeless his position, or no matter
how severely he was wounded, it was almost unheard of for a Japanese soldier
to throw in his hand.”63 In Burma, the last act of many a cornered Japanese sol-
dier was to clasp a grenade to his stomach and detonate it.64 Typically, Allied
soldiers explained this behavior by reference to their own version of the ethnic
war complex, emphasizing the peculiarities of Japanese culture and the ways
in which the cult of the Emperor was woven into the discipline of the IJA.65
As with Western militaries prior to World War I, Japanese doctrine empha-
sized overcoming weight of firepower through ‘spirit.’ A very harsh training
regime, firm discipline, and extensive indoctrination of junior officers played
important roles in the inculcation of offensive spirit.66 Certainly these factors
were in part responsible for the extraordinary determination of Japanese troops
to fight to the ‘last man, last round.’
There were, however, additional reasons for this behavior. Japanese soldiers
were told by their own command that the Allies would horribly mistreat and kill
them if they surrendered.67 Such warnings were not wholly misplaced. It is im-
possible to verify the numbers and the evidence is partly anecdotal but many
Japanese prisoners were killed out of hand by British and imperial troops. This
often happened immediately after capture while the POWs were in the hands
of frontline infantry troops being escorted rearwards, or when Japanese soldiers
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were trying to surrender.68 On at least two separate occasions, Indian soldiers
mass murdered captured wounded Japanese, immolating 120 in one incident
and burying alive between twenty and fifty in another.69 British and imperial
soldiers who carried out such acts could justify them by reference to the well-
known Japanese mistreatment of Allied prisoners.70
However, there were relatively few Japanese prisoners for British and Impe-
rial troops to mistreat or murder. Aside from the IJA’s fighting spirit, a signifi-
cant reason for this was that it was common practice to kill every Japanese on
the battlefield itself. As Gian Singh wrote in his poem “Kohima,” a battle in
which he fought:
No prisoners we took, no mercy we gave
Their crimes against comrades we never forgave.71
Offering no quarter was justified by the notion that all Japanese were danger-
ous until dead.72 An operations research report from the first Chindit operation
noted in their first engagement some apparently dead Japanese springing back
to life to shoot some British troops in the back. From then on it became “uni-
versal practice to put a round or a bayonet into any Jap not obviously dead . . .
This undoubtedly resulted in many potential prisoners being killed, but it was
a very necessary practice.”73 The report notes that the Japanese did the same to
Allied dead and wounded. Such stories of Japanese treachery, which have coun-
terparts on other Pacific War battlefields, were widespread among combat
troops and served to justify similar, reciprocal actions.74 After a British officer
was killed by a Japanese soldier feigning death, his friend wrote “We found out
then what we were never afterwards to forget—it doesn’t pay to leave wound-
ed Japs breathing.”75
That British and imperial troops generally left no Japanese alive on ground
they occupied goes some way towards accounting for a feature of Japanese
battlefield behavior that did not square with their legendary ‘fanaticism.’ It
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was not at all unknown for the Japanese to flee when their positions were
overrun.76 “the Jap . . . can show a good turn of speed when driven out of a
position.”77 Of one action in which twenty-four Japanese were bayoneted and
grenaded in their holes by attacking East African troops, a British officer com-
mented in a letter home, “The odd thing is, after all one has heard [about Jap-
anese fanaticism], that the Japs were absolutely scared stiff and took every
possible opportunity of beating it.”78 On other occasions Japanese in posi-
tions being overrun would simply stop fighting and wait to be killed by the
assaulting British or imperial troops. One report commented they “will often
stop fighting and wait for death if our troops use the bayonet and get within
fifteen to twenty yards of their positions.”79 A jungle warfare school lecturer
told his students that the Japanese held their positions with determination “un-
til attacking [troops] are very close, and then appear to crack up, cowering at
the bottom of the trench, waiting to be bayoneted. If he wants the bayonet, so
let it be.”80
Simply put, the problem of surrender for troops on both sides was that sur-
rendering was very dangerous if not impossible. Allied soldiers believed, with
reason, they would be mistreated or killed if they surrendered. Likewise, Japa-
nese soldiers had every reason to believe that they, too, would be mistreated or
killed if they tried to surrender. Depending on the situation, many soldiers on
both sides may simply have chosen to go out fighting or take their own lives
when confronted with such realities. When a wounded West African soldier was
recovered by his unit after two days hiding in the bush, “He explained to his
rescuers he had not worried because if his own people found him everything
would be all right and if the Japs found him—he startled the doctor by pro-
ducing a grenade from inside his tunic—he had only to pull the pin and every-
thing would still be all right.”81 No one in this instance had recourse to extraor-
dinary cultural explanations as the man’s willingness to blow himself up
probably seemed perfectly reasonable to those who found him given the many
stories of Japanese mistreatment of prisoners circulating in Allied formations.82
The remark of a lone Japanese soldier captured hiding in a village perhaps re-
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flected the wishes of many soldiers in Burma for escape from such dire and lim-
ited choices. He told his captors “I want to resign.”83
The problem of surrender in Burma is one example of a feedback loop that
increased the intensity of the fighting. Surrendering can act as a ‘safety valve’
for battlefield violence. A defending force which surrenders in timely fashion,
before inflicting heavy casualties on the attacker, might be allowed to do so
without severe mistreatment.84 However, the more casualties inflicted on the
attacking troops, the less likely they will offer quarter. Prohibitions against sur-
render serve to foreclose exits and intensify the fighting. Jungle terrain also led
to intensified combat in Burma. Close terrain meant that engagements often oc-
curred at extremely short ranges and in conditions of surprise, lending them a
kill-or-be-killed quality often lacking at longer distances.
Wherever fighting takes on a ‘last ditch’ no-quarter character, the energies
built up can find release in battlefield atrocities ranging from refusal to take pris-
oners to the massacre, immediately afterwards, of any enemy who do survive.85
One Japanese officer in Burma described such situations in this way: “After
fierce battles when many comrades were killed, men were excited and felt
strong hatred against the enemy soldiers and were provoked to kill even help-
less prisoners.”86 Such battlefield processes shaped soldiers’ actions on both
sides, contributing to an intensifying spiral of savage fighting and atrocity.
Georg Simmel offers a framework for thinking about how the common bat-
tlefield context in Burma shaped soldiers’actions on both sides in similar ways.
Simmel conceives conflict as a structure shared by the competing parties.87 As
a structure, conflict operates to shape the nature of the parties involved in com-
mon ways, by for example increasing the internal cohesion of each side. Sim-
mel begins from a sociological premise of human similarity, rather than one of
ethnic difference. Humans have similar capacities which can be actualized
when they are placed in conflict situations. Particular attributes and actions of
the parties to a conflict emerge conjuncturally in the conflict situation itself and
are not necessarily the product of some pre-existing social or cultural charac-
teristic of one or another of the parties, but rather are effects of the structural
relations at work.
Such an analytic move need not involve denying the differences in the cul-
tural and military backgrounds of the soldiers who found themselves at war in
Burma. These certainly played a role in shaping the structure of the conflict.
But Simmel suggests how it is that soldiers from remarkably different back-
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grounds might come to behave in remarkably similar fashion. As Cameron ob-
served of the U.S. marines on Guadalcanal, “the way in which the cultural val-
ues of the enemy, so often portrayed as alien to the West, were matched among
the marines is striking.”88 The battlefield was the site of an interactive game in
which if one side ‘upped the ante,’ so to speak, by refusing to surrender or take
prisoners, the other side had to respond in some fashion. The commander of the
marines on Guadalcanal remarked of the Japanese “These people refuse to sur-
render . . . You can readily see the answer . . . war without quarter.”89 Such in-
teractions formed a common structure which then exercised its own influence
on the fighting. Resisting to the ‘last man, last round’ in Burma and elsewhere
is not necessarily evidence of some extraordinary individual motivation or of
ideological indoctrination. It can also be a very human and understandable re-
sponse to a harsh situation. That such last-ditch resistance serves to evoke a sim-
ilar response from the enemy points to the existence of the self-generating dy-
namics of battlefield violence, and hence to the value of the kind of structural
approach being suggested here. As Clausewitz remarks, “Each side . . . com-
pels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead,
in theory, to extremes.”90
It is important to emphasize the constraints on agency from the perspective
of the individual soldier revealed by the problem of surrender and other com-
mon battlefield situations in Burma, such as the defense of an all-round perime-
ter. These had to be defended vigorously, since a breach could mean the col-
lapse of the entire position. Soldiers failing to do so faced the prospect of being
overrun, bayoneted or grenaded in their holes, or falling into the hands of an
enemy known to mistreat prisoners. As a result, more than a few of the twenty
Victoria Crosses earned by Indian soldiers in Burma were awarded for the
valiant defense of a perimeter. Veteran officers and men understood the reali-
ties of perimeter defense and, for those who could overcome their fear, these
were reason enough to fight with grim determination. Jemadar Parkash Sing of
the 14/13th Frontier Force Rifles was wounded four times before expiring as he
and his men struggled to hold their section of a perimeter and evict the Japa-
nese who had gotten in.91 Not only do such examples illustrate the importance
of primary group theory’s central insight—fighting for group survival in con-
ditions of mortal danger—but they also point to the very limited options avail-
able. Any course of action other than vigorous defense made it that much more
likely the position would be overrun and one would meet one’s end at the point
of a Japanese bayonet.
This discussion has conceived battle as a structure, formed by the interaction
of both sides and shaping participants and their actions in important ways. Bat-
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tle is more than simply an armed clash between two culturally distinct, pre-
formed opponents. In Ernst Jünger’s phrase, it is “a condition of things.”92 As
with all structures, analysts must exercise caution in assessing the narrations
and representations offered by agents caught up in them. The reasons for such
caution derive in part from the always problematic relation between structure
and representation, as structures are to greater or lesser degree opaque to the
agents shaped and formed by them. In the case of battle, there are additional
considerations, arising from the enormous stress and the extraordinary psychic
energies involved. Representations of battle by participants are often attempts
to come to terms with their experiences and actions and to make some mean-
ingful sense of the absurdities of war. Whether in the form of letters, memoirs,
interviews, or official documents, such representations cannot be taken at face-
value. Yet, neither military history nor sociology has devoted significant atten-
tion to just how such evidence of ‘the face of battle’ should be interpreted. What
follows is an attempt to sketch out how to think about British and imperial rep-
resentations of racial antagonism in the Burma campaign as well as the place
of race hate in battle more generally.
“Why Fight Japan?”93
In what was known as “political India”—intellectuals, politicians, and articulate
urban opinion—there were conflicting views regarding Japan. Some sympa-
thized strongly with the Allied cause, while others held Japan in high regard as
an independent Asian power or saw in the war an opportunity for Indian inde-
pendence. But “political India” stood at some distance from the army regulars as
well as the mostly illiterate and uneducated peasants who would volunteer for ser-
vice during the war. Any consideration of the role and nature of racial antagonism
among imperial troops must begin with an account of their capacity to understand
the ostensible political identities and purposes at stake in the war they fought in.
According to one estimate, 90 percent of Indian recruits were illiterate on
joining the forces.94 In 1943, 82 percent of infantry recruits in the Indian Army
were illiterate.95 The soldiers who filled out the ranks of the infantry battalions
were for the most part from isolated peasant communities and had very little in
the way of education until their military service. The situation was not much
different in East and West Africa. Educated imperial recruits were far more like-
ly to be sent into the technical, non-combat branches of service. The men who
did the fighting, therefore, began the war with very little knowledge of Japan
or Burma or the scope and nature of the war.
Carfrae describes using a map to give orientation lectures to his Nigerian
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troops. “This is where the Germans live. Here is Italy, there France . . .”96 Car-
frae had trouble keeping the men awake for these affairs. In the Indian Army
one morale official noted, “it is only the small number of educated [men] who
can have any real appreciation of the development of the war as a whole.”97 In
1943, officers responsible for propaganda and information for Indian troops re-
alized that “‘extensive propaganda, in a geographical sense,’ was too compli-
cated for the average Indian soldier to assimilate.”98 The fighting troops sim-
ply lacked the necessary education and breadth of experience.
As useful as illiteracy was from the perspective of imperial control, insulat-
ing soldiers in part from nationalist politics, by the Second World War even in-
fantry combat had become highly technical. Imperial militaries had to become
vast centers of education.99 Education was double-edged from the point of view
of the imperial authorities, since soldiers had access to ever more information
which could not be entirely controlled by the military. In part as a consequence
of these developments, army information and propaganda policies became an
important aspect of the war effort.100
In the Indian Army, in the wake of the retreat from Burma in 1942, there was
great concern about ‘defeatism’ among the men, and a determined effort to de-
velop a degree of political commitment to the war was undertaken. It took the
form of the “Josh” system. “Josh” means “pep,” “spirit,” or enthusiasm in Urdu.
The basic idea was for specially trained officers in each unit to meet informal-
ly with small groups of troops to discuss the war. A range of propaganda pub-
lications for Indian troops were produced, and “Josh” officers were briefed on
the lines they were to take with the men. In the words of an instruction pam-
phlet for “Josh” officers, the purpose was to “build in every Indian soldier the
knowledge and firm faith that the Japanese and everyone who represents the
Japanese are his own personal enemies.”101
Atrocity propaganda played an important role. Various Japanese horrors
committed against Indian soldiers or Indian expatriates in Japanese-occupied
areas were described to the men in publications or talks. Prominence was giv-
en to the rape of Indian women and Japanese disrespect for Indian religions, of-
ten combined as when Indian women were reported to be raped inside places
of worship.102 Propagandists invented conflicts between Indian cultural and re-
ligious practices and the Japanese. Hindu soldiers, for example, were told that
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the Japanese were cruel to cattle and that they desecrated temples.103 Other
variations included Sikh POWs being forced to shave their beards and cut their
hair or Hindu or Muslim troops being forced to handle or eat beef or pork, re-
spectively.104 Indian soldiers passing through the 14th (Training) Division,
gathered in small groups, were asked “Did you know that Jap fathers sell their
daughters into brothels and that this is a widespread custom in Japan?”105
The extent and the effectiveness of the “Josh” system and other propaganda
efforts is unclear. Sanjoy Bhattacharya emphasizes the significance, in main-
taining Indian Army morale, of information on material benefits available to
soldiers and their families, as against “atrocity propaganda.”106 One intelli-
gence report noted “trying to make [Indian Army soldiers] hate Jerry or the Jap
is somewhat artificial.”107 When some of the “Josh” propaganda lines were de-
scribed to one former officer, he quipped “I would have thought my sepoys were
smarter than that.”108 More generally, there is no reason to think that Indian
frontline troops differed from other combat soldiers in their reaction to ‘hate the
enemy’ style propaganda. As other scholars have commented, efforts to arouse
hatred of the enemy and enthusiasm for the war effort are most effective on the
homefront.109 Soldiers on active duty are typically skeptical of official propa-
ganda and have far more immediate concerns. One report on British soldiers in
India noted they are “extremely suspicious of lectures and instructions on Cur-
rent Affairs. It all sounds like official ‘dope.’”110
In their ignorance of Japan and the politics of the Far Eastern War, Indian sol-
diers were not so very different from British ones. A report on British infantry
in India noted, “Before the sudden entry of Japan into the war, the average
British soldier knew little or nothing of the Japanese.”111 Yet many British sol-
diers developed an intense hatred of the Japanese during the course of the
war.112 The report just quoted, written in 1943 by a committee of experienced
infantry commanders, goes on to note that “while there is nothing wrong with
the determination of the British Infantry soldier to fight and kill the Jap,” it is
only among those units which have already seen action that there is significant
animosity towards the Japanese.113
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That racial and other hatred of the enemy was a product of and not an input
to the fighting, at least initially, appears to have been the case for Indian troops
as well. Many did develop racist and even exterminationist attitudes towards
the Japanese once they were on campaign in Burma. While in 1943 a report
noted “there still existed a patent lack of basic conscious enmity amongst In-
dian troops toward the vaguely comprehended ‘Jap,’ the increasing bitterness
of the fighting began to produce its own effects.114 One Indian soldier wrote
home in late 1944 or early 1945, “The Japs are most uncultured and cruel . . .
They have got beastly characteristics. Such a nation should be totally de-
stroyed for the good of the world.”115 In the wake of successful Allied offen-
sive operations to re-enter Burma, a morale report noted that, “First-hand ex-
perience of the enemy’s cruelty to the occupied populations has bred a genuine
hatred of the Japanese.”116 An NCO exclaimed of the Japanese in a letter
home, “May God bring destruction to this oppressor nation.”117 A VCO
reached somewhat unsuccessfully for world historical language to describe the
meaning of the war: “This war raised by two brutal nations of the world chal-
lenges every human race to fight against it in connection to save the human
culture, morale, civilisation, and what not.”118 Other Indian soldiers turned to
the insect analogies which were widely used to describe the Japanese. An In-
dian major, mixing the ovine with the entomological, described the Japanese
withdrawal after the defeat at Imphal in these terms: “Then happened ridicu-
lous incidents when the rabble started withdrawing and every [company] like
mine would see by first light hundreds of sheep like Japs trying to get past our
positions where we had every infantry weapon sited . . . even the [company
commander] would push the bren gunmen aside and enjoy killing the Japs like
insects, brutal . . .”119
While sentiments such as these reflect a willingness and even desire to fight
the Japanese, it would be difficult to account for them by long-standing racism
in soldiers’ social contexts or by reference to political ideology. Anti-Japanese
racism among Indian soldiers developed in the course of the fighting; their use
of Allied justifications for the war were likewise occasioned by their experi-
ence of the war itself. To the extent they did, most Indian soldiers arrived at an-
swers to the question, “Why fight Japan?” only after they had already been do-
ing so. Once developed, such race hate could certainly intensify the cycle of
savage fighting. Stories of enemy atrocities functioned as self-fulfilling prophe-
cies, inspiring brutalities reciprocated by the other side.
A language of race hate, whether made available through official propagan-
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da or derived from more general cultural resources, became salient for soldiers
once they were caught up in the fighting. Racist constructions of the Japanese
served in part as an outlet for anger at the unbearable situation that, it was be-
lieved, the Japanese had created by fighting with such determination. The
processes of othering involved were in large measure generic to the campaign
and battlefield. They did not require a pre-war, civilian social context of viru-
lent racism or other radical alterity directed at some specific enemy. The fact
that combat soldiers fall back on such representations when narrating their ex-
perience does not mean racism was their ‘real’ motivation in any straightfor-
ward sense. It simply means that soldiers made use of available stereotypes
when narrating their situation and describing their conduct. The ultimate de-
terminants of the structure of battle remained more or less opaque to them.
A final example of the relation of racist representations to battlefield experi-
ence is helpful. A variety of analogies were often made between Japanese sol-
diers and various animals and insects, as in “fanatical little rats.”120 Slim him-
self was fond of an ant analogy: “The Japanese were ruthless and bold as
ants.”121 He told his officers, “Picture yourself fighting man-size red ants . . .
[the Japanese have] all the qualities and faults of the fighting ant.”122 While
certainly such a description draws on Occidental images of the Orient, it is also
rooted in the experience of fighting in Burma. The Japanese constructed elab-
orate bunker systems often connected by tunnels. Due to Allied air and artillery
superiority, they had to dig deep to survive and very often fought and died in
their holes, facilitating ant-like, rat-like and other such analogies. Additionally,
the Japanese failed to vary many of their tactical doctrines and procedures, lend-
ing further weight to the notion of a colony of ants that has fixed ways of go-
ing about things, and is consequently vulnerable; hence the notion that the Jap-
anese can be stomped on and killed like ants.123 A colony of ants also captures
the Allied experience of the Japanese as both highly modern and organized but
also as primitive and brutal. Thus the use of such analogies was in a strong sense
appropriate to the context in which British and imperial soldiers were fighting.
They served to orient officers to features of Japanese tactics and provided a lan-
guage to describe battlefield phenomena. Those weary, hungry, diseased and
defeated Japanese the Indian major quoted above saw pulling out of Imphal re-
ally were as sheep, who then fell like flies under his fire. Even in an obvious
case of the use of Orientalist and racist imagery—an Asian army of ants—it is
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contextual features that make that imagery particularly salient and widespread,
allowing it to play a role in shaping the fighting.
This section has elaborated the notion of battle and campaigning as sets of
structural relations generative of battlefield conduct and of representations of
racial antagonism. It outlined some aspects of the structurally determining char-
acter of the battlefield and how apparently ‘fanatic’ behavior, such as prefer-
ring suicide over capture, might become reasonable for anyone caught in a sim-
ilar situation. When soldiers come to narrate their experiences, they can only
do so by drawing upon the cultural resources available to them. British and
American soldiers possessed a rich stock of anti-Asian stereotypes to make use
of in representing their experiences in the war against Japan. Official propa-
ganda reinforced and revived these stereotypes and made them available to im-
perial troops. It is unsurprising that soldiers made use of these resources, pro-
viding much evidence for the ethnic war complex. But each such narrative is a
window on a structural context shared with the enemy, rather than the last word
on soldiers’ ‘real’ motivations.
conclusion: ethnicity, humanity, and war
Much of history is narrated as the story of clashing nation-states. In this story,
war and national identity become closely linked for scholars as well as more
popularly. Benedict Anderson, for example, finds in the “limited imaginings”
of nationalism the reasons “for so many millions of people . . . willingly to
die.”124 There is more than a little here of the primordialism and reductionism
Anderson so effectively critiques elsewhere. As Appadurai remarks, “In many
of these theories of the nation as imagined, there is always a suggestion that
blood, kinship, race and soil are somehow less imagined and more natural than
the imagination of collective interest or solidarity.”125 National war stories do
powerful imaginary work in conjoining ‘dulce et decorum’ with ‘pro patria.’
The ethnic war complex critiqued above is less an explicit scholarly dis-
course and more an uncritical, common sense understanding of how energies
for war are mobilized, one in which ethnic or national identities serve as ‘un-
moved movers’ of the organization and use of force. In the preceding discus-
sion, as here, there has been some conflation of ethnicity and nation. Both are,
however, forms of group identity easily conjured as the driving forces behind
wartime violence. Such imaginings seem so natural because wars, and repre-
sentations of sacrifice in war, are engines of reification.126 They help instanti-
ate an image of the world as composed of ethnic groups, nations and their home-
lands, a geography of war and identity. In circular fashion, war and other violent
conflict then can be interpreted as a confrontation between reified ethnic groups
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or nations. War plays an important role in what Akhil Gupta and James Fergu-
son term “cultural territorializations,” the contingent social and historical
processes through which peoples, places, and cultures come to be associated
with one another.127
The ethnic war complex essentializes these “cultural territorializations” and
reads them back into our accounts of war and the making of wartime violence.
This process is most obviously visible in contemporary accounts of ‘ethnic con-
flict’ in former Yugoslavia or Africa, but it is also apparent in the emphasis
placed on nationalism and racial ideology in analyses of metropolitan warfare.
Soldiers’ battlefield and other behavior, in particular their willingness to com-
mit atrocity, is said to reflect national racial prejudice. War becomes a con-
frontation between reified ethnic groups or nations, rather than a form of social
interaction through which identities are made and re-made. “It is,” as John Co-
maroff remarks, “in situations of struggle and times of trouble that the content
of ethnic self-consciousness is (re)fashioned.”128
In contrast to the ethnic war complex, this essay situated constructions of self
and other within organizational and structural context. Ethnic relations were
shaped and conditioned by military organization and wartime experience. The
radical alterity evinced in representations of battle in Burma was a product of
military and battlefield processes, rather than an essential input into wartime
savagery. A sketch of the cultural constitution of military force and the social
making of battle was offered, one which did not rely on essentialized ethnic dif-
ferences or antagonisms. As such, this essay seeks to contribute to the critical
study of war and the military.
It aims to contribute in a small way as well to the growing reflexivity in the
human sciences concerning their Eurocentric origins and governing assump-
tions. For the ethnic war complex, humans are fundamentally distinguished on
the battlefield by their ethnicity. More generally, (some) Western and especial-
ly ‘democratic’ soldiers are often differentiated sharply from, say, Nazi or Jap-
anese soldiers, who are seen as different kinds of creatures.129 “We were ratio-
nal Europeans, not fanatics,” intoned Carfrae the Chindit commander after
describing the kill-or-be-killed nature of the fighting in Burma, “therefore how
could we be expected to behave in such a way?”130 But British and imperial
soldiers did come to behave that way in many respects. In significant measure,
what is at issue are more general human capacities, rather than particular eth-
nic, national, or ‘civilizational’ identities. Emile Durkheim’s reminder to his
fellow Europeans that even the most savage of the savages has something to
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teach us about humanity qua humanity is appropriate: “The most barbarous and
the most fantastic rites and the strangest myths translate some human need,
some aspect of life, either individual or social.”131 Analyses of wartime vio-
lence need to take this turn to human commonality, rather than continuing to
emphasize ethnic difference.
peoples, homelands, and wars? 163
131 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: The Free Press,
1965), p. 14.
